Introduction
As a consequence of the financial crises of 1997-9, the question of 'global governance' appears to have come into its own as an 'agenda' for thinking about the rules and norms which underpin the present global order. Emerging understandings of the lessons of the financial crises focus on the need for the provision of a range of public goods, the absence of which is seen both to have fed the socio-economic impact of financial volatility and to have undermined the continuing viability of 'purist' versions of the neoliberal policy model. Moreover, there is increasing pressure throughout those regions of the world most affected by financial instability for national governments to redefine policy strategies in ways which provide a range of safety valves against the socio-economic 'dangers' of globalisation and liberalisation.
The process of rethinking the scope and mechanisms of governance, as well as the concrete policy strategies it might entail, has as one of its central components a reevaluation of the public domain as a means by which collective goods might be provided. Thinking about public goods questions -their nature, their provision and their management -provides interesting perspectives on a particular element of the emerging notion of the public domain as it relates to nascent governance agendas.
Even in the international financial institutions themselves, and notwithstanding their continuing commitment to the principles of free market economics, there is an understanding that the liberalising and deregulatory urges of global neoliberalism have not generated the demise of national states and their regulatory activities. On the contrary, the extent of 'convergence' on a single set of policy principles, on a single pattern of government spending, and on a single conception of institutional organisation, has been far from that predicted by the 'purist' globalisers of the early 1990s. 1 demonstrations of the unsustainability of 'state-less' models of market economics incapable of providing safety nets against market failures or structures of domestic compensation for the socially deleterious effects of unfettered competition and extensive liberalisation. In short, one of the dominant understandings of the public domain, especially in Asian and Latin American countries, is of its essential (re)vitalisation or utilisation as a mechanism for the provision of a range of public goods crucial to the socioeconomic sustainability of markets. This has found its way into the policy debates currently dominating the agendas of the international financial institutions, couched broadly in the emerging language of the 'Post-Washington Consensus' (PWC). 2 However, the extent of the compatibility between the processes of reformulating policy strategies appropriate to specific historical-institutional settings (in effect, what is happening 'on the ground' in various regions and countries) and the mainstream of the 'governance' debates in the corridors of the international financial institutions is often over-stated. While an essentially 'top-down' vision of global governance -or more weakly, 'multilateralism from above'-prevails within the policy making circles of the major international institutions, this is not the case in the developing regions of the world. Indeed, if the top down view was ever more than a pietistic vision, the financial crises in East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere since 1997 have rendered it redundant, at least for the time being. In the same way as those analyses with limited area studies knowledge are inclined to play up the unexpectedly swift recovery of the world economy as evidence of the limited nature of financial crises (and the limited collateral damage caused to the dominant policy consensus), those approaching public goods questions from a 'top-down' perspective are often excessively optimistic of the prospects for genuine cooperation between states on matters relevant to a revamped global governance agenda.
The financial crises, we will argue, have had a much greater impact than many, flushed with signs of 'market bounce back', appear to appreciate or concede. It is 2 Joseph Stiglitz, 'More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus', 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki, 7 January 1998: from http://www.worldbank.org/ html/extdr/extme/js-010798/wider.htm undoubtedly true that the development of the PWC to contain impact on the standing of the Washington Consensus (WC) is, at best, moderate reformism in action. But this should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental impacts of the crises in Asian and Latin American countries 3 ; most notably in relation to the development of negative attitudes amongst regional policy elites in their attitudes towards IMF-US Treasury style agendas for coping with the crises. The resistive attitudes of regional policy elites -seen for much of the 1990s as supportive of Washington consensus policies on liberalisation, privatisation and de-regulation -represent an insufficiently appreciated added dimension of the 'globalisation backlash' 4 that has developed throughout the second half of the 1990s.
In this sense, even if there is some consensus on a PWC -an assertion we qualify later in the paper -it is emphatically not the case that Asian and Latin American policy elites in particular, or wider political actors in general, will acquiesce in a global governance agenda in a manner to which the international institutions and rich countries aspire. There are at least three reasons for this. The first, we argue, is that the globalisation backlash encompasses a resurgent antipathy to the agents of Western capitalism in Asia (and, we might predict, in Latin America in due course), which is likely to prevent the emergence of a settled intellectual consensus of what constitutes global public goods. Second, the debate over what constitute public goods have to date largely been conducted in arenas from which 'developing countries' 5 are excluded (notably the G7) or within which their influence over the intellectual debates (as in the erstwhile Bretton Woods institutions) is at best limited. Third, the capacities 3 Our focus in this paper is on the East Asian and Latin American regions, although Russia was also affected by financial instability. For more on this case, see Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, 'Russia and the IMF', International Affairs 75:1 (1999). 4 Eric Helleiner, 'Post-Globalization: Is the financial liberalization trend likely to be reversed?' in Boyer and Drache (eds.), States Against Markets. Interestingly, as early as 1986 Susan Strange also predicted a political backlash against what she termed 'casino capitalism': 'when a whole generation becomes disillusioned with the economic system and can see no escape from the roller-coaster alternation of deflation and stagflation, there are bound to be political reactions ..... these political consequences must sooner or later spill over into international relations'. (Casino Capitalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 192-3) . 5 We use these terms with a full appreciation of their shortcomings as analytical categories and empirical classifications. For a discussion of approaches to 'development' as an area of study, including a full analysis of the inadequacies of conventional terminology, see Anthony Payne, 'Reframing the Global Politics of Development', paper presented to the Working Group on Development Theory at the Ninth General Conference of the EADI, Paris, 22-25 September 1999. of the states of Asia and Latin America -and more specifically the willingness of their policy elites to provide public goods or participate in global public goods agendas, while never as developed or as normatively driven as those of the policy elites of OECD countries, have been seriously eroded by the negative impact on their economic well being occasioned by the recent financial instability. The combination of these three conditions appears to militate against the meaningful engagement of Latin American and Asian countries in the debates on the international collaboration for the provision of public goods currently underway in a number of international fora and, moreover, against the engagement of national governments in this sort of public policy in the domestic and regional settings.
As a result, the central arguments of this paper are two-fold. The first is that the dynamics of multilateral collective action that had been seen to be emerging throughout the 1990s at both global and regional levels have been altered in important ways under the impact of financial crises in Asia and Latin America. Our second argument is that the role of national states in Asia and Latin America is concerned less with the provision of public goods than with the minimisation of 'public bads'. The provision of collective goods under conditions of globalisation becomes, for developing countries, an exercise in addressing the collateral damage to national societies and economies arising from financial crises specifically, and by the globalisation of neoliberalism more generally. In this sense we argue that this minimisation of 'bads' (here understood principally as financial volatility, market failure and the social costs of global liberalisation) is, at the end of the twentieth century, rooted in the rethinking of neoliberalism that we see as underway among policy elites and societies, and in a growing normative concern to address the inequities generated by global liberalisation. This is an inherent part of the debates about the appropriate role of public authorities, and their relationship with other elements of the state-civil society-market nexus.
Such a distinction between public 'goods' and 'bads' is not an exercise in semantics, but it does require clarification. Environmental degradation, for example, is a public 'bad', but its management, by (potentially) converting degradation into sustainability, is a public 'good'. Global environmental policy, in this way, is simultaneously the management of a public bad and the provision of a public good. The same applies to the major examples examined in this paper: financial volatility and the social costs of global liberalisation are the public bads while financial stability and social compensation are the public goods. Our argument, however, is that in Asian and Latin American contexts they are understood principally as public 'bads', the effects of which require minimisation in the interests of equity, justice and stability. Social policy agendas, for example, are approached visibly within the debates on globalisation. And public policy is considered in the context of the conditions of globalisation which significantly condition the capacities of policy-makers and the results of policy initiatives themselves.
The pursuit of public goods is invariably understood to be most effectively achieved by positive problem-solving through collective action. By contrast, public policy aimed at the minimisation of public bads tends to be an essentially reactive process which states pursue more often than not on an individualist rather than collective basis. The minimisation of public bads becomes the provision of public goods, but it is the nature of the 'bads', as well as the strategies employed to 'manage' them, which legitimates our distinction. We argue this case because while state policy making elites of Asia and Latin America have been bruised and humiliated by the financial crises of the last few years and are clearly conscious of their diminished sovereignty, they remain cognisant of the need to control the 'public bads' that emanate not only from the crises but also from the effects of technology on cultures, eco-systems and the international order (especially the spread of drugs, crime, terrorism, disease and pollution). They do not appear willing, however, for the further erosion of sovereignty that would be required to tackle these problems collectively.
In this sense, despite impeccable theoretical arguments (both analytical and normative) in favour of collective action problem solving, the prospects for regular successful international cooperation amongst states must not be exaggerated. The key factor explaining inter-state cooperation -notwithstanding the recognised impacts of globalisation -is still domestic actor preferences. 8 While we would share the view that predominates in the major international institutions that the desired basic public goods for a 'just' global era (economic regulation, environmental security, the containment of organised crime and terrorism, and the enhancement of welfare) must be provided collectively, we argue that at present there is a lack of state capacity and normative political will in Asian and Latin American countries to act in this way.
This paper is self-consciously an examination of what we perceive to be the 'big picture'. This 'backlash' in Asia and Latin America and its implications for the development of a consensus on the provision of collective or public goods are the subject of this paper. We locate these discussions within the broader framework of the reconsideration of the public domain, both in the international financial institutions and in specific local and regional settings. In our focus on the response of national policy elites to the limits of global liberalisation and the failed 'management' of the socio-political dislocations occasioned by the 'globalisation' of inequity our analysis is avowedly state-centric. This is not, we would stress, the same as being 'statist'.
Rather it is to suggest that state policy elites are but one important group of actors in the development of a more explicit normative concern with equity and justice in the recent intellectual policy debates. These debates -ongoing between civil society, state and market actors (via NGOs and Global Social Movements, governmental and inter-governmental international institutions, corporate actors and Davos style events)
-form the basis not only for rethinking neoliberalism in particular, but also for redefining the policy agenda associated with 'collective goods' and 'public domain' questions in general.
We start from the assumption that despite the variety of arenas in which political activity takes place in the global economy, there are principally three 'levels' at which the provision of public goods might be pursued by national states. The first is through engagement in the global policy debate; that is those agendas which seek to maximise collaboration between state and non-state actors for the governance of the global commons and the provision of collective goods and which are being driven by the policy community in the international institutions. The first section of the paper will address this discussion of the prospects for the collective provision of global public goods in the PWC era. In so doing, it argues that 'top down' global governance agendas of the kind envisaged in the PWC and the activities of, say, the UNDP to enhance the provision of global public goods, are highly problematic and likely to be limited in their success.
The second 'level' is the domestic setting. For reasons that will be elaborated later, we combine our discussion of this with the third, regional, level. Thus the second section of the paper examines the economic, institutional and socio-political constraints on the capacity of states to engage in public policies for the pursuit of collective goods within and beyond the territorial state. It is argued that the financial crises have sharpened existing limitations on the fiscal and institutional, as well as political, abilities of national states to engage in anything more than a minimal approach to public goods. In addition, financial crises have led to a visible fragmentation of the regional policy making arenas which for a good part of the 1990s were thought to be The reality, however, was that the window of opportunity had closed and the first real backlash against globalisation was fully in train. have generated huge increases in un-and under-employment in various parts of the world, rather than job creation as a result of enhanced competitiveness and efficiency.
Further, as it has become more difficult to tax capital, it is more difficult to run welfare states. Thus it is harder for governments, even if they so wish, to provide the compensatory mechanisms that underwrite social cohesion in the face of changing employment structures. And the inability of governments to tax capital calls for a redistribution of tax burdens to other socio-economic groups, the distributive consequences of which have had usually significant political effects.
Liberalisation and deregulation thus cease to be simply sound economic theory. They also become contentious political practice. Rather than being recognised as welfare enhancing overall they are seen to have negative redistributive consequences that disturb prevailing social structures and which the 'invisible hand' of markets is incapable of addressing. The result is the emergence of a genuine debate, in policy and It is precisely for this reason that, despite the self-congratulation of its authors (and the faddish appeal of 'governance' to IPE scholars), the PWC is likely to be as unacceptable as the WC has proved to be. While the PWC certainly must be welcomed as a key component of policy debates in the aftermath of the financial crises, it cannot constitute a template for an emerging 'global governance' agenda, nor even an emerging policy agenda. It suffers from the same failings as its predecessor.
The PWC is no less universalising, and attempts to be no less homogenising, than the WC itself. Global policy debates, in this way, remain reliant on a set of 'generalisable' policy prescriptions, although clearly the nature of these prescriptions now offers a more subtle understanding of market dynamics than in the early years of global neoliberalism. National and regional policy responses to financial crisis, which are discussed in the second section of the paper, demonstrate that the notion of 'convergence' -on a WC, a PWC or any other of the dominant 'global' understandings of a governance agenda -is redundant. The exhaustion of 'one-sizefits-all' formulas, at least in developing countries, is not reflected in the substitution of one universalising doctrine with another.
There are several overlapping dimensions to these observations. The 'universalisation' of a PWC agenda implies the universalisation of an understanding of governance based on efficiency and effectiveness, in which democratic accountability will be (and is) a secondary variable. Indeed, much of the policy prescriptive work on governance currently being undertaken in or around the international institutions treats governance as a neutral concept in which rationality in decision making and efficiency in A similar argument can be extended to the attempts by the WTO to secure greater NGO input into the deliberations on the continued reform of the trading system while at the same time recognising the anarchic effect that any such widening of the deliberative process might have on the traditional structure of trade negotiations.
The Dynamics of Global Collective Action
This preceding section attempted to review the search for a Post-Washington Consensus. In so doing, it focused largely on the debate within the international public policy community on the 'global governance' debate. But the practical and conceptual shortcomings of the PWC and governance agendas are only part of the story.
Incentives to participate are maximised by perceptions of the normative fairness and equity of the system itself 36 which, when viewed through the lenses of the developing countries, appear less than optimal. Moreover, quite apart the difficulties more Olson's logic predicts that, given the free-rider problems inherent in collective action, it is only in the presence of significant 'selective incentives' that the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation will be perceived as favourable to the actors involved.
As a relevant illustration, let us take the case of financial stability as a public good.
There is a strong awareness in developing countries of the role played in conditioning the nature and impact of the financial crises by 'moral hazard' considerations on the part of the lenders. While it is certainly the case that the world economy was sustained largely intact by the strength of the US economy over the last couple of years
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, as a result of moral hazard the 'burden' fell disproportionately on those national markets (and societies) which experienced currency collapse. As a result, the negative externalities of global financial deregulation were shouldered principally by the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America. Conversely, the positive externalities of action by national policy elites to reduce local economic instability accrued to other agents in the world economy. As a result, as well as shouldering the burdens of moral hazard in the crises, there is a perception in developing countries that the free-rider problem applies also to the subsequent process of economic recovery. This is seen in some ways as a reversal of the moral hazard question, in that the inadequacies of regulation at the global level compel state action at the local or regional level, which in turn benefits those industrialised economies which might otherwise be threatened by global recession or be obliged to put together further packages to bail out sinking currencies.
In an environment characterised by complex interdependence, the positive and negative externalities of any collective action will be felt by agents outside the However, the capacity of Asian and Latin American states to address in meaningful fashion collective goods issues, especially in domestic settings, is also significantly constrained by sets of institutional, political and socio-economic limitations which 42 We are not insensitive to the plight of the countries of Africa, but they are not the focus of this paper and the do not attract FDI of any significance. Indeed, for some African countries, aid is the only source of foreign investment.
have been sharpened and supplemented by the fall-out from the financial crises. The priority of Asian and Latin American states, therefore, has become one of minimising public bads rather than supplying public goods. Our understanding of 'governance', in this sense, is complicated by the reality that those parts of the world most in need of the provision of public goods are least able to engage in the proactive kinds of public policy required to provide them. 'Top-down perspectives' inherent in both the global governance agenda and the PWC fail to capture the 'bottom up' complexities of the collective provision of public goods.
State Capacities and the Fragmentation of the Regional Modus Operandi
As we understand from an observation of the growth of the 'new regionalism' in both the developed and developing world, the principal arena for collective action in recent years has been regional. 43 Even before the financial crises, the difficulties inherent in international cooperation and the benefits of pursuing liberalisation in the regional agenda led to the primacy of regionalism as a modus operandi for the collective pursuit of public goods. 44 The regionalisation of policy activity in this way structures of economic and socio-political activity in a globalising economy, has meant that the ability -and in some cases willingness -of national states to undertake in isolation the provision of key public goods has been significantly eroded.
Moreover, the neoliberal discourse of globalisation, implicitly if not explicitly, held that it was undesirable to do so.
In this context, the predominant impact of recent instability on regional projects has been fragmentary. In periods of crisis, as we have seen, the dynamics of collective 'East Asian' (for example) flavour. The point in the meantime is that the regionalism as a modus operandi for collective action for public goods has been decimated by the impact of financial crisis and the backlashes it propelled.
Let us therefore take a step back and look in more detail at the globalisation backlash within Asian and Latin American countries. At the domestic level, as we have seen, the financial crises have unleashed a process of rethinking significant aspects of the neoliberal and globalisation projects. The search for policy alternatives to date might well be predominantly rhetorical, but it is real. The rhetoric of the opening of 'windows of opportunity' and the need for Asian economies to 'toe the line' was common in the immediate aftermaths of devaluations, when appeasing the IMF was crucial for generating the funds necessary to climb out of financial collapse and for reassuring foreign investors. But these short-term strategies only thinly disguise a very significant backlash against globalisation and its attendant economic ideology.
In Asia, governments (most notably Malaysia and Thailand) were quick to abandon the monetary and fiscal dictates of the IMF. In a more complex sense it also refers to those social interests that are able to participate meaningfully in the social process of global change. Specifically, globalisation has acted to increase the mobility of capital and, as a result, the 'exit option' of the mobile capital asset holders in the domestic economy. 53 The problem, of course, is that the exit option becomes increasingly attractive to these actors in times of economic difficulty. Economic agents are most likely to exercise exit options than 'voice' options. As a result, the tensions between social groups mentioned above as a by-product of globalisation is sharpened and the owners of internationally mobile capital assets become 'disengaged' from their 'national' economic communities. 54 In this way, national economies become fragmented and differentiated as a function of varying ideas concerning economic organisation. Societies become atomised as economic activity concentrates the benefits in the hands of a few detached agents. Political impetus for policy change in response to globalised inequity has a high price tag, especially in the absence of strong capital inflows or in the presence of strong capital outflows. Therefore, even after the financial crises, the imperative remains for states to structure public policy in ways which interfere little with the mainstream of global economic interchange and the activities of local private agents. Now clearly this has been the dominant understanding of the role of governments in an era of globalisation. The provision of public goods such as stable exchange rates, adequate taxation systems, macroeconomic conditions conducive to the global competitiveness of private sectors, property rights, the rule of law, and so on, are deemed to be the principal residual role of national states when their regulatory and welfare functions have been eroded by the process of economic globalisation. But the policy challenge has changed in the context of the globalisation backlash. The challenge has become one of how to combine the reactivation of the welfare and regulatory roles of states (as essential elements of a 'public' domain) with economic models that continue, more or less, to revolve around liberalised private sector activity. The provision of public goods must also be understood as the management of the public bads associated with social exclusion and market failure. The major case study of such policies has turned out to be Malaysia, which in the aftermath of its currency crisis introduced a ban on the repatriation of capital for a period of 12 months, a ban on the trading of the ringgit overseas, and a freeze of the dollar-ringgit exchange rate, as well as limitations on the amount of national currency
Malaysians could take overseas. In February the first of these controls was softened into an 'exit tax' on capital, which has the same effect of discouraging short-term capital flows, but which was designed to make the Malaysian investment regime more investor-friendly than previously. The broad challenge at the national level has thus involved questions of how to maintain necessary capital flows while restricting the less desirable forms of finance, which inevitably reduces incentives for foreign investors across the spectrum.
This intellectual change of heart can also be seen in parts of the international policy community. The espousal of such neoclassically 'unorthodox' economic strategies by prominent international economists is much less uncommon than in the pre-Thai 55 Chile imposed a minimum holding period of 12 months for equity investments and a reserve requirement (encaje) of 30% of the total value of the loan for foreign loans to Chilean entities as a means of avoiding the accumulation of short-term debt. See John Williamson, 'The Implications of the East Asian Crisis', mimeo, 1998 from http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSGR/; ECLAC, The Impact devaluation days. The exemplar is, of course, the impeccably credentialled senior economist at the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, who has argued that capital account liberalisation needs to be moved back on the policy agenda of emerging market economies. 56 At the very least, as the 1999 World Development Report argues, sequencing is now seen to be crucial and capital liberalisation should only follow the establishment of sound supervisory banking procedures and legal infrastructure.
Notwithstanding the importance that they place on the partially self inflicted nature of emerging market problems, even Washington has now recognised that the push for the capital liberalisation, as part of its wider ideological shift in favour of freer markets fostered the vulnerabilities that were the underlying cause of the economic crisis in Asia and that subsequently spread to Russia and Latin America. Senior figures in the first Clinton Administration -Mickey Kantor, the former USTR and Laura Tyson, the former chair of the Council of Economic Advisors -have conceded that they were insensitive to 'the kind of chaos that financial liberalisation could provoke'. As former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown noted, 'it is easy in retrospect to see that we probably pushed too far and too fast ... we overshot, and in retrospect there was a certain degree of arrogance'.
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The degree of convergence on the substance of these policy debates, however, is usually exaggerated. There are different forces at work 'on the ground' in Asian and Latin American countries than at work in the corridors of international organisations and US government offices. Asians and Latin Americans policy elites clearly prefer tighter rather than looser regulation of markets, but preferably not imposed on them by the existing international institutions as they are presently constituted. The financial crises have generated precisely the sorts of 'distrust and animosity' which Inge Kaul et al see as detracting from the possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation at the international level. 58 There is a generalised perception among both the Asian and Latin
American policy communities and the populations at large, that they, not the of the Asian Crisis on Latin America, (Santiago, 1998) The rhetoric in industrialised countries about burden-sharing -the implication being that developing countries do not share the burdens of global public goods -is more than matched by perceptions in developing countries that the burdens of moral hazard, social dislocation and the impact of unfettered competition are unloaded on precisely those economies and societies that are least equipped to deal with them. In an era of deregulated capital movement and the processes of financial change which brought us the hedge fund, pegged exchange rates and precipitous currency collapses, the notion of global burden-sharing is putting the cart before the horse.
Conclusion
This paper has traced the emergence of a policy debate on a global governance agenda that aspires to provide for the collective provision of some global and local public goods. This agenda is enveloped in the language of a Post-Washington Consensus that is clearly a response to the backlash that followed the financial crises that hit the emerging markets of Asia, Latin America and Central Europe from 1997. It stems from a recognition within the international policy community that without the development of a more humanised and equity-driven development strategy for the world's poorer countries, global economic liberalisation may contain within it the seeds of its own demise. While we recognise that this agenda does represent a qualitative change from the pre-crisis days of the Washington Consensus era, we have argued that it is nevertheless likely to be constrained in the successful provision of what its sees as global public goods associated with transparency, safety nets, institutional effectiveness, and so on. Globalist imaginings of governance, 
